THE USE OF FORCE BY LAW ENFORCEMENT
OFFICERS IN EFFECTING SEIZURES OF PERSONS

This Comment focuses on the law governing the use of force by police in
conducting arrests and investigative stops. The examination includes review and comparison of the existing deterrents to and remediesfor the use
of excessive force in effecting these fourth amendment related seizures.
Consideration is given to the recent Tennessee v. Garner, in which the Supreme Court narrowed the use of deadly force in certain arrest situations
by application of the fourth amendment. This Comment finds that a need
exists for further clarity, conformity, and modernization both in the law
and in the remedies. To help meet that need, this Comment proposes a
model statute. The proposed statute is designed both to clarify the meaning of reasonableforce and to provide more effective responses to the use
of undue force.

INTRODUCTION

On July 18, 1984, police responded to a situation at a fast-food
restaurant in San Ysidro, California. By the time the so-called "McDonald's Massacre" had ended, twenty-one people were dead, including the gunman, James 0. Huberty, who had been felled by a
SWAT team sharpshooter.' The police use of force in killing
Huberty was not only legitimate, but inarguably necessary, given the
particular circumstances of the attack.2 However, few cases in which
the police use force against citizens are as clear-cut as in the San
Ysidro tragedy.
An essential function of the police as the paramilitary unit of the
criminal justice system is to enforce the law by detecting and apprehending violators.' To accomplish this task, the police are empowered to detain and take violators into custody, and most importantly,
1. A twenty-second person died the following day, and nineteen others were
wounded. San Diego Union, July 20, 1984, § A, at 1, col. 6.
2. Huberty was armed with three weapons: a pistol, an Uzi rifle, and a pumpaction shotgun. When police arrived at the scene, Huberty directed his fire at responding
police cars. The amount of fire coming from the restaurant initially led police to believe
that there was more than one gunman. L.A. Times, Aug. 3, 1984, § II, at 1, col. 4.
3. See U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, WHO IS GUARDING THE GUARDIANs? A REPORT ON POLICE PRACTICES 149 (1981) [hereinafter cited as GUARDIANS].
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to use force in so doing. 4 The legitimate use of force becomes an

issue in two types of police-citizen encounters: arrests,5 and investi-

gative stops.' Both of these are seizures7 within the meaning of the

fourth amendment, While standards have been set which outline acceptable police behavior in initiating an arrest 9 or an investigative
stop, 10 rules concerning the permissible degree of force to effect such
seizures are not clear. Consequently, an important issue is whether

the rules which do exist sufficiently guide officers in the performance
of their duties while protecting citizens from the dangers of undue
force.
There are several sources of law which could provide stricter standards for the permissible degree of force which can be used to effect
a seizure. They include the Constitution, statutes, case law, and ad-

ministrative rules. These standards often conflict with each other and
are, at times, nebulous.1" The Supreme Court has recently provided
a Constitutional limitation to the use of deadly force" in Tennessee
4. ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: THE URBAN POLICE
FUNCTION 10 (1978) [hereinafter cited as ABA PROJECT].
5. An arrest is "the taking of another into custody for the actual or proposed
purpose of bringing the other before a court, body or official or of otherwise securing the
administration of the law." Perkins, The Law of Arrest, 25 IOWA L. REV. 201, 201
(1940).
6. An investigative stop is a "brief detention of a person for investigation. A stop
occurs when an officer uses his authority to compel a person to hault, or to remain in a
certain place, or perform some act." ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY AND POLICE FOUND.,
MODEL RULES FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT: STOP AND FRISK RULE 4 (1975).
7. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 (1968) ("[W]henever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has 'seized' that person.").
8. The amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or things to
be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend XIV.
9. An arrest made without probable cause is an unreasonable seizure under the
fourth amendment. See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 415 (1975); Wong Sun
v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 479 (1963).
Probable cause exists where "the facts and circumstances known to the officer warrant
a prudent man in believing that the offense has been committed." Henry v. United
States, 361 U.S. 98, 102 (1959).
10. The predicate to a lawful stop is reasonable suspicion. The officer must be
able to "point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant the intrusion." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21
(1968).
11. See GUARDIANS, supra note 3, at 43-44. This report called for "clear and
restrictive state laws, local ordinances, and departmental rules on the use of force." Id.
12. A research project by the International Association of Chiefs of Police defines
"deadly force" as "that force which is intended to cause death or great injury or which
creates some specified degree of risk that a reasonable and prudent person would consider
likely to cause death or great injury." K. MATULIA, A BALANCE OF FORCES: A STUDY OF
JUSTIFIABLE HOMICIDE BY THE POLICE, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 32 (1982).
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v. Garner.'3 In light of Garner, numerous statutes now apparently
are unconstitutional; others differ greatly among states. Administrative rules, which must conform to state law, vary widely among departments.' Regarding the use of non-deadly force'" to arrest or
stop, the line between reasonable and unreasonable force is obscure.
Civil and criminal proceedings seek to define reasonable force after a
seizure, when the degree of permissible force used by the officer is
questioned. The case law in this area, however, is often less clear in
its determination of reasonable force than are statutory standards.
This Comment examines the current state of rules regulating the
use of force to effect an arrest or an investigative stop. Concurrently,
it assesses the adequacy of existing deterrents and remedies available
when excessive force is used. The Comment suggests that more restrictive legal rules, which reflect a progressive view of law enforcement, are essential. To this end, a model statute is proposed,
designed both to limit the use of force and make compensation more
available.
THE USE OF FORCE TO EFFECT AN ARREST

The privilege to use force is concomitant with the power to arrest.' No right to use force exists if the arrestee submits to the of-

ficer's authority." The use of substantial force arises in two principal
arrest situations: when the arrestee resists, or when the arrestee
flees.'" The primary distinctions between the various approaches to
the use of force concern their restrictions on deadly force. Therefore,
the discussions of deadly and non-deadly force will be treated separately to clarify the differences and similarities between the rules.
13. 53 U.S.L.W. 4410 (U.S. Mar. 27, 1985). In Garner,the Court held that the
Tennessee statute which authorized the use of deadly force to arrest an apparently nonviolent burglary suspect was unconstitutional. For further discussion of Garner,see infra
notes 19-23 and accompanying text.
14. See C. MILTON, J. HALLECK, J. LARDNER & G. ALBRECHT, POLICE USE OF
DEADLY FORCE 47 (1977).
15. Non-deadly force is force not likely to cause death or serious bodily harm.
Perkins, supra note 5, at 289.
16. Note, Justificationfor the Use of Force in the Criminal Law, 13 STAN. L.
REV. 566, 569 (1961).
17. Agee v. Hickman, 490 F.2d 210, 212 (8th Cir.) cert. denied, 417 U.S. 972
(1974) (force can only be used to overcome physical resistance or threatened force);
Moats v. Village of Schaumber, 562 F. Supp. 624, 629 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (no force may be
used if arrestee submits to arrest).
18. Perkins, supra note 5, at 268.

Deadly Force
In Tennessee v. Garner,19 the Supreme Court held that the use of
deadly force to effect the arrest of an unarmed, nondangerous felony
suspect is unconstitutional as an unreasonable seizure under the
fourth amendment.20 The Court found that Tennessee's statute,
based on common law, was unconstitutional in that it overly broadly
authorized the use of deadly force to arrest all felony suspects.2 The
Court thus abrogated the common law rule, discussed infra. The
Court held that deadly force may be used only where the suspect
poses a threat of physical harm to the officer or others.22 Thus, under
Garner, deadly force is permissible "if the suspect threatens the officer with a weapon or where there is probable cause to believe that
he has committed a crime involving the infliction or threatened infliction of serious physical harm. 23
Tennessee v. Garner represents the first time that the Supreme
Court has addressed the constitutionality of a statute authorizing the
police use of deadly force. The impact of Garner will be illustrated
by a discussion of the statutory law as it existed when that case was
decided. The Supreme Court's longstanding silence on this issue contributed to great variations among standards on the use of deadly
force. Ignoring departmental rules for the moment, limitations on
the permissible degree of force to effect an arrest can be attributed
to three sources: (1) common law; (2) modified common law; and (3)
Model Penal Code. Each one of these approaches authorizes an officer to use deadly force other than in defense of life. Only the first
approach, the common law felony-misdemeanor rule, was struck
down by Garner.
Common Law Felony - Misdemeanor Rule

The common law felony-misdemeanor rule aligns the boundaries
of permissible force with the suspected class of crime. 24 An officer
may use any force, short of deadly force to arrest for a
19. 53 U.S.L.W. 4410 (U.S. Mar. 27, 1985). Garner, a 15 year-old eighth grader
was killed by police as he fled from the scene of a burglary. The officer who shot the boy
did not believe that the boy was armed or dangerous. Id. at 4410, n.2.
20. Id. at 4412.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. A distinction between felonies and misdemeanors is set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 1
(1982) as follows:
1) Any offense punishable by death or imprisonment for a term exceeding one
year is a felony.
2) Any other offense is a misdemeanor.
3) Any misdemeanor, the penalty for which does not exceed imprisonment of six
months or a fine of not more than $500, or both, is a petty offense.

[VOL. 22: 587, 1985]

Effecting Seizure
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

misdemeanor.25 In the case of a felony, deadly force may be used if

reasonably necessary to effect an arrest.2 6 Until Garner, deadly force

was legally justified provided that the crime for which the officer had
probable cause to arrest was defined as a felony. Under this ap-

proach, the use of deadly force was permissible for such crimes as

murder,27 auto theft,2 8 and even income tax fraud.2 9 The common
law rule evolved when all felonies were dangerous and punishable by

death. 30 Deadly force was then justified because the arrestee had, in
effect, forfeited his life by committing a felony.31 In contrast, few
felonies today are punishable by death,32 which resulted in an erosion of the historic rationale for this rule. Despite widespread criti-

cism by scholarly authorities, 3 nearly half the states followed the
common law rule when Garner was decided.3 4

Modified Common Law
As a reaction to the statutory creation of numerous non-violent

felonies and the decline in the use of capital punishment, some states
25. Stinnett v. Commonwealth, 55 F.2d 644, 646 (4th Cir. 1932); Petrie v. Cartwright, 114 Ky. 103, 104, 70 S.W. 297, 299 (1902). See Moreland, The Use of Force in
Effecting or Resisting Arrest, 33 NEB. L. REV. 408, 409 (1953).
26. Id.
27. See State v. Sundberg, 611 P.2d 44, 47 (Alaska 1980).
28. Jones v. Marshall, 528 F.2d 132, 133 (2d Cir. 1975).
29. Many jurisdictions classify income tax fraud as a felony. Id. at 138. For example, see CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 19405 (West 1983).
30. Moreland, supra note 25, at 409.
The common law felonies, as listed in State v. Sundberg, 611 P.2d 44, 47 (Alaska
1980), were rape, murder, manslaughter, robbery, sodomy, mayhem, burglary, arson,
and prison break. This list comprises the felonies that were recognized in England in
1500.
31. Moreland, supra note 25, at 409.
32. For example, in Tennessee v. Garner,53 U.S.L.W. 4410, 4413 (U.S. Mar. 27,
1985), the Court noted that many crimes classified at common law as misdemeanors are
now felonies. Furthermore, many crimes formerly punishable by death, such as rape, no
longer are. The Court found that "[t]hese changes undermine the concept, which was
questionable to begin with, that the use of deadly force against a fleeing felon is merely a
speedier execution of someone who has already forfeited his life." Id. at 4413.
33. See, e.g., Sherman, Execution Without Trial: Police Homicide and the Constitution, 33 VAND. L. REV. 71 (1980); Comment, Deadly Force to Arrest: Triggering
Constitutional Review, 11 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 361 (1976).
34. These states are Alabama, Arkansas, Connecticut, Florida, Idaho, Kansas,
Mississippi, Michigan, Missouri, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Washington, Wisconsin,
Maryland, Virginia, and West Virginia. See Tennessee v. Garner, 53 U.S.L.W. 4410,
4414, no. 14(U.S. Mar. 27, 1985). The Supreme Court in Garner acknowledged that
there was not an "overwhelming trend" away from the common law rule, but instead, a
"longterm movement." Id. at 4414.

have modified the common law rule.35 Under the modified rule, the
use of deadly force is either restricted to "dangerous felonies" or
only permitted for specific felonies. 36 Consequently, under this rule,
the use of deadly force is usually limited to cases of murder, rape,
37
arson, burglary, robbery, kidnap, mayhem, and aggravated assault.
Except for the case of burglary, this approach is acceptable under
Garnerbecause these "dangerous felonies" involve either past or present elements of physical harm. However, many of the criticisms applicable to the common law rule may also apply to this standard. For
example, not all of these felonies are punishable by death. Even for
those crimes that are, imposition of the death sentence must be preceded by the constitutional safeguards of trial. 38 Furthermore, a
classification of felonies for which deadly force is permissible does
not necessarily address whether the arrestee is dangerous at the time
apprehension is attempted. Therefore, this rule is potentially as problematic as the common law rule in that it also fails to equate the use
of deadly force with the dangerousness of an arrest situation and
with the severity of subsequent punishment.
Model Penal Code
A more restrictive approach regulating the use of deadly force to
arrest is the Model Penal Code39 (the Code). The Code allows the
officer to use deadly force only when the crime for which the arrest
is made involved the use of deadly force, or if the officer believes the
arrestee will cause death or serious bodily harm if arrest is delayed. 40
35. These states are Alaska, Arizona, California, Georgia, Illinois, Louisiana,
New York, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, and Utah. See Wukitsch, Survey of the Law
Governing the Police Use of Deadly Force, 55 N.Y. B.J. 12, 14 (1983).
36. K. MATULIA, supra note 12, at 10. For example, in Long Beach Police Officers Ass'n v. City of Long Beach, 61 Cal. App. 3d 364, 372, 132 Cal. Rptr. 348, 353
(1976), a police officers' association challenged the constitutionality of administrative
rules that were more restrictive than state law. The court upheld the regulations and
found that "[i]n view of the great expansion of crimes which have been made felonies...
deadly force may be used only against felony suspects if the felony is a 'forcible and
atrocious one' ..... "
37. K. MATULIA, supra note 12, at 10.
38. See, e.g., Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 301 (1976) ("mandatory
death penalty statute for first-degree murder departs markedly from contemporary standards respecting imposition of punishment" and cannot be applied consistently with
eighth and fourteenth amendments); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 195 (1976) (death
penalty may not be imposed in arbitrary or capricious manner); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421
U.S. 684, 704 (1975) (one has the right to be presumed innocent and have guilt determined beyond a reasonable doubt).
39. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.07 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
40. Id. The relevant section of the Code provides that the use of deadly force is
not justifiable unless:
(i) the arrest is for a felony; and
(ii) the person effecting the arrest is authorized to act as a peace officer or is
assisting a person whom he believes to be authorized to act as a peace officer;
and
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The Code forbids the use of deadly force to arrest for crimes against
property, 41 so long as no life is or has been threatened. A few states
follow this approach,
which clearly fits within the standard articu42
lated in Garner.
Though the Model Penal Code abandons the outdated felony-misdemeanor distinction, it has been criticized because it requires an
officer to make a split-second decision about whether the crime involved deadly force.43 In addition, critics note that the Code, like the
common law and modified common law, still allows an officer to inflict greater punishment than a court. 4 As a practical matter, any
rule regarding justifiable deadly force requires an officer to make
quick decisions. Furthermore, even when an officer kills an arrestee
in self-defense, the "punishment" is in theory greater than that likely
to be prescribed by a court where a trial by judge or jury must necessarily precede the imposition of the death penalty.

(iii) the actor believes that the force
employed creates no substantial risk
of injury to innocent persons; and
(iv) the actor believes that:
(1) the crime for which the arrest
is made involved conduct including the use or threatened
use of deadly force; or
(2) there is a substantial risk that the person to be arrested
will cause death or serious
bodily harm if apprehension is
delayed.
41. Among the offenses the Code classifies as property offenses are burglary, arson, robbery, and theft. See MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 220-224.14 (Proposed Official Draft
1962).
42. These states are Colorado, Delaware, Hawaii, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Minnesota, Nebraska, North Carolina, and Texas. See Wukitsch, supra note 35, at 14.
43. Mattis v. Schnarr, 547 F.2d 1007, 1023 (8th Cir. 1976) (Gibson, C. J., dissenting) vacated as moot sub nom. Ashcroft v. Mattis, 431 U.S. 171 (1977); accord
Harper, Accountability of Law Enforcement Officers in the Use of Deadly Force, 7
BLACK

L.J. 347, 357 (1982).

In Tennessee v. Garner, 53 U.S.L.W. 4410, 4415 (U.S. Mar. 27, 1985), the Court
addressed the problem of split-second decisions in relation to the rule which prohibits an
officer from using deadly force against non-violent fleeing felons. The Court noted that
many situations, such as investigative stops, require an officer to make snap judgments.
The Court, however, reasoned that it is equally, if not more, difficult for an officer to
make a felony-misdemeanor distinction which the common law rule required as a predicate to the deadly force. Furthermore, the Court noted that in those states which have
restricted the use of deadly force to dangerous suspects, little litigation has occurred
involving the second-guessing of officers' decisions.
44. Harper, supra note 43, at 357.

Administrative Regulations

Further restrictions on the use of force permissible to effect an
arrest are found in administrative policies of police departments. Because state statutes are often written in very broad terms, depart-

mental policies may vary in degrees of restrictiveness. The International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) recommends limiting
the use of deadly force to situations where the officer reasonably believes that deadly force is necessary to protect himself or another
from death or serious bodily harm. 45 The IACP's 1982 study of the
nation's fifty-seven largest municipal police departments found that
most departments restricted the use of deadly force to a greater degree than state law. 46 The majority of departments surveyed permitted the use of deadly force to arrest for a crime which involved
deadly force.4 7 In contrast, a small percentage authorized the use of
deadly force to arrest for any felony.48 In the past decade, other
studies have illustrated the possibility of variation among departmental policies. 49 Administrative rules may range from a duplication of
45. K. MATULIA, supra note 12, at 34. The International Association of Chiefs of
Police (IACP) suggests that "[a]n officer may use deadly force to protect himself or
others from what he reasonably believes to be an immediate threat of death (or near
death) critical to bodily harm." Regarding fleeing arrestees, the IACP states in even
clearer language that "[a]n officer may use deadly force to effect, capture, or prevent the
escape of a suspect whose freedom is reasonably believed to represent an imminent threat
of grave bodily harm to the officer or other person(s)." Id. at 35. (emphasis in original)
46. Id. at 11.
In Tennessee v. Garner, 53 U.S.L.W. 4410 (U.S. Mar. 27, 1985), the Court found
police department policies a compelling reason to abandon the common law rule. First,
the Court noted that restrictive administrative rules cast a "dubious indicium of constitutionality" on a statute based on the common law. Id. at 4414. Second, because so many
police departments have restricted their policies on the use of deadly force without any
increase in crime, there is no indication that restrictive rules hamper police in the performance of their duties. Id. at 4415.
47. The IACP found that 81.1% of the departments authorized the use of deadly
force to arrest a felon who used deadly force. Similarly, 84.9% permitted the use of
deadly force to arrest a felon threatening deadly force. In contrast to the use of force to
effect an arrest, 17% of the departments permitted the use of deadly force to arrest any
felon. Id. at 28-29.
48. Only 7.5% of the departments permitted the use of deadly force to arrest any
felon. Id.
49. See C. MILTON, J. HALLECK, J. LARDNER & G. ALBRECHT, POLICE USE OF
DEADLY FORCE 38-59 (1977). This study examined the police use of deadly force in
seven American cities. The authors found that all of the departments surveyed had a
provision concerning the use of deadly force. However, the regulations .varied in terms of
restrictiveness and specificity. For example, some departments permitted the use of
deadly force to arrest only for specific felonies; others permitted its use for the apprehension of any felon. Id. at 49. See also Uelmen, Varieties of Public Policy: A Study of
Police Policy Regarding the Use of Deadly Force in Los Angeles County, 6 Loy. L.A.L.
REV. 1 (1973). Uelmen surveyed fifty police departments in the Los Angeles area by way
of interviews with police officers and administrators, review of written policy, and analysis of firearms discharges. Uelmen concludes his study with a suggestion that a policy
review board be established to determine statewide policy on the use of deadly force. Id.
at 63.
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state law to authorizing its use only in self-defense."
Federal Policy
The policies of federal law enforcement agencies are noteworthy
for their limitations on the use of deadly force. For example, Federal

Bureau of Investigation (FBI) policy prohibits an officer from shooting anyone except in defense of his own'life or the life of another.5 1
The Federal Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs and the Secret Service also operate under defense-of-life restrictions. 2 This
standard is, by far, the most restrictive, chiefly because it eliminates
the use of deadly force to effect the arrest of a fleeing felon, even one
who used deadly force in the commission of his crime. Because an
officer may kill only in protection of life, his individual authority to
decide which arrest situations justify the use of deadly force is

restricted.
Non-deadly Force

Unlike the distinctions in the above-mentioned rules regarding justifiable use of deadly force by law enforcement personnel, boundaries
restricting the use of non-deadly force are virtually unlimited.

Hence, any force, other than deadly force, which is reasonably nec-

essary to effect an arrest may be used.5 3 This standard cloaks an

officer with broad discretion to determine the degree and type of
force required in each situation. Therefore, the question of reasonableness is measured by the arresting officer's subjective interpretation of facts. 4 Because each case is considered so wholly on its own
50. Id. at 10-I1.
51. FBI policy states:
Agents are authorized to use that amount of force reasonable and necessary to
impose custody and overcome resistance and to ensure the safety of the arresting
officers, the arrestee, and others in the vicinity of the arrest ....Agents are not
to shoot any person except as necessary in self-defense or defense of another,
when they have reason to believe they or another are in danger of death or
grievous bodily harm.
Letter to the author from Gary M. Laturno, Principal Legal Advisor to FBI, June 13,
1984 (on file with the San Diego Law Review).
52. Harper, supra note 43, at 361.
53. Perkins, supra note 5, at 361.
54. See Amato v. United States, 549 F. Supp. 863, 869 (D.C.N.J. 1982) ("determination of whether or not force was excessive ...is to be made on the basis of facts as
they reasonably appear to the officer"); Samuel v. Busnuck, 423 F. Supp. 99, 101 (D.C.
Md. 1976) ("the reasonableness or excessiveness of force is to be determined in light of
the circumstances as they appeared to the officer at the time of the arrest"); Dauffenbach
v. City of Witchita, 8 Kan. App. 2d 303, 310, 657 P.2d 582, 587 (1983) ("the officer has

facts, clear standards for the use of non-deadly force have failed to
develop. Instead, at issue is not whether the force used was merely
unnecessary, but whether it was grossly excessive.5 5 This standard
gives the officer considerable latitude in his discretion to use force.
Unless flagrantly excessive, the force used to arrest is assumed to be
the proper response to the situation."'
The determination of reasonable force may be further complicated
when resistance by the arrestee creates a right of self-defense in the
officer. An officer may not use more force than is necessary in selfdefense,5 7 but his or her discretion as to what constitutes self-defense
may be given great deference. For example, in Agee v. Hickman, 8
the resistance offered by the arrestee consisted of doubling his fists
and "squaring off."59 The court acknowledged that the arrestee did
not touch the officers, yet ruled that punching and slapping the arrestee was reasonable responsive conduct.60 Further complicating the
matter, the defense of self-defense may also be invoked by a passive
arrestee who claims he was arrested with excessive force. Though no
citizen has the right to resist an arrest made with probable cause,6
the submissive arrestee does have a right to defend himself should
the officer use excessive force. 62 Hence, an arrestee charged with
the discretion to determine the degree of force required under the circumstances as they
appear to the officer at the time").
55. Perkins, supra note 5, at 266.
56. See, e.g., Haislah v. Walton, 676 F.2d 208, 213 (6th Cir. 1982) ("the rule
does not require that, in retrospect, the amount of force used must actually have been
necessary"); Samuel v. Busnuck, 423 F. Supp. 99, 101 (D.C. Md. 1976) (courts should
not be "Monday morning quarterbacks"); Conklin v. Barfield, 334 F. Supp. 475, 479
(W.D. Mo. 1971) (officer "not required to nicely measure and narrowly gauge the force
to the amount required from a deliberate retrospective view").
57. An officer may use enough force to counter resistance and also consummate
the arrest. See Moreland, supra note 25. See also State v. Foster, 60 Ohio Misc. 46, 60,
396 N.E.2d 246, 259 (1979) (officer may not use more force than is necessary to arrest
and to protect himself); Melichar v. Northern, 534 P.2d 832, 833 (Colo. 1975) (force
used by officer in self-defense must be reasonable and applied when officer was in apprehension of bodily harm).
58. 490 F.2d 210 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 972 (1974).
59. Id. at 211.
60. Id. at 212.
[W]hen a man under arrest doubles his fists and 'squares away' there is no legal
or practical reason that the officer has to give him the 'first lick' before using
reasonable force to overcome a show of force. A quick punch in the stomach and
a few slaps across the face may save the officer from getting skinned up in a fist
fight.
Id.
61. See United States v. Simon, 409 F.2d 474, 477 (7th Cir.) cert. denied, 396
U.S. 829 (1969). Some courts have abandoned the common law rule that one has a right
to resist an arresi which is unlawful because it lacks probable cause. They hold instead
that one may not use force to resist an unlawful arrest. See, e.g., People v. Curtis, 70
Cal. 2d 347, 352, 450 P.2d 33, 37, 74 Cal. Rptr. 713, 717 (1969). This view is also taken
by the MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(2)(a) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
62. People v. Stevenson, 31 N.Y.2d 108, 112, 286 N.E.2d 445, 449 (1972); People v. Curtis, 70 Cal. 2d 347, 352, 450 P.2d 33, 39, 74 Cal. Rptr. 713, 719 (1969).
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resisting arrest or obstructing justice may respond by asserting selfdefense. 63

The right to defend oneself from unwarranted physical peril is beyond question for law enforcement officers and private citizens. How-

ever, the right may be abused on either side. One scholar found in a
1966 study that many officers routinely followed their own use of

force with a fabricated charge of resisting arrest against the arrestee.

4

Citizens, as well as police, are known to resort to lying to jus-

tify their own use of undue force.65 While these accounts should not
be unduly emphasized, they illustrate the additional difficulties of

determining whether excessive force was used when an officer or citizen commits perjury to justify unreasonable conduct.
Rules Reflect Balancing of Societal Interests
The rules restricting the use of force to effect an arrest ostensibly

are an attempt to reflect that society is interested in achieving peace
and order through vigorous law enforcement. 66 In some instances,

immediate apprehension of the arrestee may be given priority over
protecting the arrestee's life or physical well-being. In other cases,

the interest in aggressive law enforcement may become secondary to
the physical safety of persons other than the arrestee. For example,
63. See State v. Castle, 48 Or. App. 15, 18, 616 P.2d 510, 512 (1980); State v.
Martinez, 122 Ariz. 596, 597, 596 P.2d 734, 735 (1970).
64. Reiss, Police Brutality- Answers to Key Questions, in A. NEIDERHOFFER &
A. BLUMBERG, THE AMBIVALENT FORCE 321, 323 (1970). In a seven-week study of three
police departments, Reiss and 36 observers accompanied police in patrol cars and monitored booking procedures. The observers found that "some policemen even carry pistols
and knives they have confiscated while searching citizens; they carry them so that they
may be placed at a scene should it be necessary to establish a case of self-defense." Id.
65. H. GOLDSTEIN, POLICING A FREE SOCIETY 161 (1977). Goldstein observed
that the most difficult cases to resolve are those involving excessive police use of force or
verbal abuse. According to Goldstein, "[tlhat otherwise honorable citizens resort to lying
is well established. It is also clear that some police officers lie to justify an action. The
task is further complicated because many of the people with whom the police have contact are unscrupulous individuals." Id.
66. In Jones v. Marshall, 528 F.2d 132, 142 (2d Cir. 1975), now overruled by
Garner,the court upheld the common law felony-misdemeanor rule and concluded that
''some room must be left to the individual states to place a higher value on the interest
...in peace and order, and vigorous law enforcement, than on the rights of individuals
reasonably suspected to have engaged in the commission of a serious crime." The language here is unfortunately misleading because mere reasonable suspicion would not justify any arrest, much less one made with deadly force.
In Tennessee v. Garner, 53, U.S.L.W. 4410, 4412 (U.S. Mar. 27, 1985), the Court
also weighed the state's interest in law enforcement. The Court, however, was not "convinced that the use of deadly force is a sufficiently productive means of accomplishing
[this interest] to justify killing nonviolent suspects." Id.

the use of warning shots and firing from vehicles has been discouraged largely because of potential risk to innocent persons.6 7 Officers
are also held to a duty of extraordinary care if bystanders are
threatened in a situation that would otherwise compel the use of firearms.6 Furthermore, one scholar has noted that in situations where
hostages are involved, conscious decisions
are often made to avoid
69
even the appearance of force by police.
These examples indicate that the protection of life is also a fundamental interest of society which is reflected in law enforcement. In
many situations, police refrain from the use of unnecessary and arbitrary force to protect innocent persons. However, when probable
cause to arrest exists, legal standards on the use of force are inadequate. The Court in Garner indeed narrowed an officer's authority to
use deadly force. However, its holding still permits an officer to use
deadly force when he has probable cause to believe a given suspect
had in the past committed a crime involving force. This is true even
if the suspect is not currently dangerous. Furthermore, virtually no
restrictions adequately guide an officer as to what constitutes reasonable non-deadly force. The lack of refinement of these standards
makes any person who is arrested vulnerable to the danger and indignity of undue force.
THE USE OF FORCE TO EFFECT AN INVESTIGATIVE STOP

The use of reasonable force is likewise privileged when a police
officer makes an investigative stop.70 While probable cause is necessary to justify an arrest,71 a lesser criterion of reasonable suspicion is
sufficient for a lawful stop.72 Accordingly, restrictions on the use of
force are more stringent in the area of investigative stops. Though
the "[f]ourth amendment does not require a policeman who lacks..
. probable cause to simply shrug his shoulders and allow a crime to
occur or a criminal to escape,17 - the use of deadly force to effect a
67. The IACP espouses this policy. The IACP also found that 67.9% of the 57
departments surveyed did not permit warning shots. K. MATULIA, supra note 12, at 3637.
68. Amato v. United States, 549 F. Supp. 863, 870 (D.C.N.J. 1982). See also
MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.07 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
69. Reiss, Controlling the Police Use of Deadly Force, 452 ANNALS 123, 127
(1980).
70. See United States v. Thompson, 558 F.2d 522, 524 (9th Cir. 1977) ("A police
officer attempting to make an investigatory stop may properly display some force when it
becomes apparent that an individual will not otherwise comply with his request to
stop."). See also United States v. Streifel, 665 F.2d 414, 422 (2d Cir. 1981); United
States v. Coades, 549 F.2d 1303, 1305 (9th Cir. 1977) (both holding that a police officer
may use reasonable force to effect a stop).
71. Supra note 9.
72. Supra note 10.
73. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 145 (1972).
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seizure based upon reasonable suspicion is prohibited.7 4 Because an

investigative stop is an exception to the fourth amendment's requirement of probable cause to seize,75 courts more closely scrutinize the
manner by which this seizure is made.
In sharp contrast to an arrest made with excessive force, an investigative stop made with excessive force takes on substantial evidentiary consequences. A major difference between an arrest and a stop
is that, in the latter, the analyses of reasonable suspicion and reasonable force are made concurrently in a suppression hearing. 6 The
question considered is whether the degree of force transformed what
would otherwise be deemed an investigative stop into an arrest for
which probable cause is required."' Hence, excessive force to stop
may invalidate the seizure as an arrest without probable cause despite the existence of facts sufficient to constitute reasonable suspicion. The sanction of the exclusionary rule results.1 8
Distinguishing a stop from an arrest by the degree of force employed may pose a close question because in both situations force is
used to restrict a person's freedom. However, the purpose of a stop is
not to take a person into custody but to detain him briefly to allow
the officer to investigate suspicious facts.7 9 The officer's conduct
must be concordant with the nature of a stop as a non-custodial
seizure. 80 Because some stops involve more force than some arrests,
74. See MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 110.2(3) (Proposal
Official Draft 1972). Because deadly force is not allowed in any jurisdiction in misdemeanor arrests based upon probable cause, the prohibitiofi of the use of deadly force
when only reasonable suspicion exists is consistent with the law of arrest.
75. See, e.g., Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 210 (1979); United States v.
Vasquez-Santiago, 602 F.2d 1069, 1072 (investigative stops involve an exception to the
general rule requiring probable cause).
76. A suppression hearing is an evidentiary hearing, held before a judge sitting
without a jury, to determine whether the incriminating evidence was lawfully obtained. J.
CREAMER, THE LAW OF ARREST, SEARCH AND SEIZURE 263 (1968).
77. United States v. Merritt, 695 F.2d 1263, 1267 (10th Cir. 1982); United
States v. Ceballos, 654 F.2d 177, 178 (2d Cir. 1981); United States v. Harrington, 636
F.2d 1182, 1186 (9th Cir. 1980).
78. The exclusionary rule requires that evidence obtained by way of a fourth
amendment violation be suppressed. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
79. See Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972), wherein the Court stated that
"[a] brief stop of a suspicious individual, in order to determine his identity or to maintain
the status quo momentarily while obtaining more information, may be most reasonable in
light of the facts known to the officer at the time." Id. at 146.
80. See United States v. White, 648 F.2d 29, 33 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (distinguishing
a stop from an arrest depends o'n objective facts and the subjective impression they create); United States v. Patterson, 648 F.2d 625, 632 (9th Cir. 1981) (in determining
whether an arrest or stop has occurred, the question is whether a reasonable person
would conclude he was under arrest).

the use of force alone is not always determinative of the legality of
the seizure. 81 Nevertheless, courts closely evaluate stop situations in
which 82
the type of force used is of a kind normally associated with an
arrest.
Types of Force Used to Effect a Stop

Use of Guns
Some courts have found that the use of guns is not reasonable
force to effect an investigative stop because guns are a type of force

objectively associated with an arrest. 83 For example, in United States
v. Strickler,84 the court found that the police officers' armed ap-

proach to the defendant's surrounded vehicle was conduct irreconcil-

able with an investigative stop. 85 The court held that the seizure was

an illegal arrest because the officers lacked probable cause.86 Likewise, in United States v. Ceballos,8 7 the court found that an arrest
without probable cause occurred when the officers conducted the
stop by blocking the defendant's car and approaching with guns
drawn.88 The court also implied that, had the officers had more reasonable justification to use guns, the stop may not have been deemed
an illegal arrest.8 9 The Ceballos court reasoned that the possible
danger of the suspected offense cannot alone justify so coercive a
stop.9 0
In contrast, other courts have upheld the use of guns to effect a

81. United States v. Gomez, 633 F.2d 999, 1006 (2d Cir. 1980) (officer may display some force when making a stop); United States v. Thompson, 558 F.2d 522, 525
(9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 914 (1978) (some display of force does not transform a proper stop into an arrest).
82. See, e.g., United States v. Merritt, 695 F.2d 1263 (10th Cir. 1982); United
States v. Ceballos, 654 F.2d 177 (2d Cir. 1981) (defendants asserted that guns were used
during stops).
83. See United States v. Ceballos, 654 F.2d 177, 184 (2d Cir. 1981) (guns are
one of the trappings of a traditional arrest).
84. 490 F.2d 378 (9th Cir. 1974).
85. "[Wle simply cannot equate an armed approach to a surrounded vehicle
whose occupants have been commanded to raise their hands with [a stop]." Id. at 380.
86. Id.
87. 654 F.2d 177 (2d Cir. 1981).
88. Id. at 184.
89. "[Tjhe officers articulated no facts which they viewed as creating a need for
the use of force and a degree of intrusion beyond that generally employed in [investigative stops]." Id. at 183-84.
90. Id. Other cases wherein the court found the use of guns to be irreconcilable
with investigative stops include: United States v. Johnson, 626 F.2d 753, 755 (9th Cir.
1980) (arrest occurred when officers faced defendant with guns pointed); United States
v. Larkin, 510 F.2d 13, 14 (9th Cir. 1974) (drawn weapon constitutes an arrest, not a
stop); United States v. Lampkin, 464 F.2d 1093, 1095 (3d Cir. 1972) (gunpoint approach constituted an arrest).
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stop.9 1 In assessing the reasonableness of detention with a gun, these
courts consider, inter alia, the nature of the crime under investigation, the location and time of the stop, and the reaction of the sus-

pect.9 2 In other words, the degree of force must be justified by the
particular facts known to the officer who initiates the stop.93 If these
facts lead an officer to believe reasonably that a gun is necessary for

his protection, the use of a gun is upheld by these courts.94 An anal95
ogy may be drawn to the protective frisk upheld in Terry v. Ohio,
in which the frisk is justified solely as a means to protect the
officer. 96
Use of Handcuffs

The use of handcuffs, like the use of guns, is a type of force nor-

mally associated with an arrest. Consequently, there are also conflicting standards regarding handcuffs as reasonable force while
making an investigative stop. In People v. Campbell,97 the court held
91. See United States v. Merritt, 695 F.2d 1263, 1274 (10th Cir. 1982) (question
is not whether the force used was so great as to render the stop an arrest, but whether it
was reasonable); United States v. Maslanka, 501 F.2d 208, 213 (5th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 912 (1976) (police officers' armed approach did not transform stop into
an arrest); United States v. Balsamo, 468 F. Supp. 1363, 1384-85 (D.C. Me. 1979) (officers' armed approach did not constitute an arrest).
92. United States v. Aldridge, 719 F.2d 368, 372 (11th Cir. 1983) (drawn gun
was reasonable where officer was alone at three o'clock in the morning); United States v.
Harley, 682 F.2d 398, 402 (2d Cir. 1982) (the totality of circumstances bear on the issue
of reasonableness); United States v. White, 648 F.2d 29, 33 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (case
would be easier if it involved a dark spot or one lone officer).
93. According to Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), the standard for determining
the reasonableness of a search and seizure is "whether the officer's action was justified at
its inception, and whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which
justified the interference in the first place." Id. at 20.
94. See United States v. Aldridge, 719 F.2d 368, 369 (11th Cir. 1983) (use of a
gun to effect a stop is permissible if the officer fears for his safety); United States v.
Jacobs, 715 F.2d 1343, 1345 (9th Cir. 1983) (the use of force while making a stop is
justified when officer fears for his safety); United States v. Merritt, 695 F.2d 1263, 1274
(10th Cir. 1982) (intrusion upon a person's physical security is outweighed by increased
protection to the officer); United States v. Beck, 598 F.2d 497, 501 (9th Cir. 1979) (force
is justified when officer fears for his safety).
95. 392 U.S. I (1968).
96. [W]e cannot blind ourselves to the need for law enforcement officers to
protect themselves and other prospective victims of violence in situations where
they lack probable cause to arrest. When an officer is justified in believing that
the individual whose suspicious behavior he is investigating at close range is
armed and presently dangerous ... it would appear to be clearly unreasonable
to deny the officer the power to take necessary measures to determine whether
the person is in fact carrying a weapon ....
Id. at 24.
97. 118 Cal. App. 3d 588, 276 Cal. Rptr. 422 (1981).

that while an armed approach by an officer was not excessive force
to effect a stop, the act of handcuffing manifested physical restraint
beyond that permissible for a stop.98 In contrast, the court in United
States v. Bautista9 upheld the use of handcuffs in an investigative
stop. 00 In Bautista, the court found that, though the act of handcuffing intensifies the intrusiveness of an investigative stop, 1°1 it may
be reasonable as a precautionary measure to ensure the officer's
safety. 10 2 Like the use of guns, then, this physical restraint seems
more likely to be condoned when it is used as a means of protecting
the officer from potential harm.
Policies on the Use of Force to Effect Stops
As with arrests, limits on the degree of force used to effect a stop
are imposed by administrative policy. For example, the Model Code
of Pre-Arraignment Procedure (the Pre-Arraignment Code) states
the general rule which prohibits only deadly force in the course of
making a stop. 10 3 Commentary accompanying the Pre-Arraignment
Code asserts pragmatically that force must be authorized to effect a
stop because, should the suspect flee, the officer would then be free
10 4
to subject the person to a lawful arrest, using force if necessary.
Apparently, the Pre-Arraignment Code assumes that reasonable suspicion of a particular offense would be escalated to probable cause
when a person flees. 105 In contrast, the Model Rules For Law Enforcement' 0 6 limit the amount of permissible force to the least coercive means necessary
to effect a stop and prohibit the use of a
07
weapon or baton.1
98. Id. at 596, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 446.
99. 684 F.2d 1286 (9th Cir. 1982).
100. Id. at 1289.
101. Id.
102. "[P]olice conducting on-the-scene investigations involving potentially dangerous suspects may take precautionary measures if they are reasonably necessary." Id. at
1289.
103.

MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 110.2(3) (Proposed Offi-

cial Draft 1972). The section provides that "[a] law enforcement officer may use such
force, other than deadly force, as is reasonably necessary to stop any person or vehicle or
to cause any person to remain in the officer's presence."
104. MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 110.2(3) commentary at
125 (Proposed Official Draft 1972).
105. In a book discussing the elements of lawful arrests, "flight" is included in a
checklist of facts indicative of probable cause. J. CREAMER, supra note 76, at 19.
106.

ARIZONA STATE & POLICE FOUND., MODEL RULES FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT:

STOP AND FRISK RULE (1975). These rules were drafted with the guidance of representa-

tives of eleven police agencies from across the country. The rules are intended to aid
police administrators in formulating policy. Id. at 1.
107. The Model Rules provide:
A. General Rule: An officer shall use the least coercive means necessary under the
circumstances to effect the stop. The least coercive means may be a verbal request, an order, or the use of physical force.
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The aforementioned standards for the permissible degree or type
of force to effect stop are often unclear. This ambiguity may be attributed to the competing interests in maximizing an officer's safety
and minimizing the intrusiveness of a stop. Even so, the case law and
rules indicate that an officer's use of force to conduct a stop is more
regulated prior to its use and more scrutinized afterwards than is the
use of force to arrest. Moreover, the possibility that the use of excessive force will transform an otherwise lawful stop into an illegal arrest, thus invoking the exclusionary rule, further underscores the relevance of the use of force to this seizure.
CONSEQUENCES OF EXCESSIVE FORCE

Though the limitations on the use of force to effect arrests and
stops are often nebulous, various sanctions and remedies are available following the use of undue force. The traditional responses to
police misconduct are the exclusionary rule, federal and state civil
actions, criminal prosecution of the offending officer, and internal
discipline. The following section of this Comment will examine the
impact that these alternatives have on police use of force.
Exclusionary Rule
The exclusionary rule is applied by the courts to deter the use of
excessive force in making an investigative stop. However, courts have
failed to consider the rule as a deterrent to the use of excessive force
in making an arrest. Recently, Alaskan courts have debated the invocation of the exclusionary rule for the use of excessive force in
arrest.1 08 In State v. Sundberg,0 9 the Alaska Supreme Court rejected the application of the rule, finding no legislative mandate for
its invocation."10 In addition, the court noted that existing deterrents
to unreasonable police conduct appeared to be sufficiently
B. Use of Physical Force: An officer may use only such force as is necessary to
carry out the authority granted by these Rules. The amount of force used to effect
a stop shall not, however, be such that it could cause death or serious bodily harm
to the person stopped. He may use his hands, legs, arms, feet, or handcuffs. If the
officer is attacked, or circumstances exist that create probable cause to arrest, the
officer may use the amount of force necessary to defend himself or to effect a fullcustody arrest.
Id. at 305.
108. See Martin v. State, 623 P.2d 1225 (Alaska 1981); State v. Sundberg, 611
P.2d 44 (Alaska 1980).
109. 611 P.2d 44 (Alaska 1980).
110. Id. at 50.

effective. 11 ' Despite its holding, however, the court warned that it
would reconsider its decision should cases involving police use of ex-

cessive force become
abundant, indicating the ineffectiveness of
112
other deterrents.

The refusal of courts to apply the exclusionary rule when an arrest
is made with excessive force is puzzling in light of the traditional
application of the rule to a fourth amendment violation. 1 3 A court
could conclude the rule is appropriate on several grounds. First, the
fourth amendment guarantees the "right of the people to be secure
in their persons ... against unreasonablesearches and seizures...

,,I" Because excessive force is by definition unreasonable conduct
during a seizure, "5 excessive force to arrest is clearly an unreasonable seizure despite the existence of probable cause. As to deadly

force, the Supreme Court clarified this point in Garner by stating
that "it is plain that reasonableness depends on not only when the
seizure is made, but also how it is carried out."" 6 Second, the previously discussed investigative stop cases indicate that the predicate to

the seizure (reasonable suspicion) does not alone make the seizure
reasonable under the fourth amendment."

7

In stops, officers have a

continuing duty once the requirement of reasonable suspicion is met
to conduct the seizure reasonably."" The manner by which an arrest
is made should also bear on the fourth amendment requirement of
reasonableness. Third, excessive force used during a search to obtain
evidence may result in application of the exclusionary rule, 1 9 despite
I l. "Potential deterrent exists in the possibility of criminal sanctions; police departmental proceedings; civil rights actions; and common law tort suits ...
" Id. at 5152.
112. "[W]e think it appropriate to caution that our holding is not immutable ...
[if other deterrents are found] illusory." Id. at 52.
113. In Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), the Supreme Court imposed the exclusionary rule on the states. The Court held that "the exclusionary rule is an essential
part of both the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments," and calls for suppression of evidence illegally seized. Id. at 657. In Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963),
the Court held that verbal evidence derived from an illegal entry and arrest is a "fruit"
of official misconduct and may be suppressed. 371 U.S. at 479.
114. The amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or things to be
seized. (Emphasis added).
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
115. Samuel v. Busnuck, 423 F. Supp. 99, 103 (D.C. Md. 1976).
116. Tennessee v. Garner, 53 U.S.L.W. 4410, 4412, (U.S. Mar. 27, 1985).
117. See supra notes 80-90 and accompanying text.
118. See supra note 93 for the test for determining the reasonableness of an officer's conduct in conducting a seizure.
119. See 2 W. LA FAvE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 5.1 (1978). Professor La Fave
argues that the exclusionary rule could apply to excessive force in the arrest process. He
bases his argument on Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) and Rochin v.
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the existence of probable cause. 120 It is logical, then, to conclude that
the rule is as applicable to the unreasonable seizure of a person as it
is to the unreasonable seizure of an object.
The deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule to excessive force in
the arrest context is untested. In some instances, the rule's effect
would be limited or non-existent. For example, if unreasonable force
used during an arrest resulted in the death of the arrestee, the application of the rule would be irrelevant.
In other instances, the exclusionary rule would be applicable as a
deterrent to the use of excessive force. For example, if unreasonable
force used was neither deadly nor egregious enough to warrant a suit
for damages, 121 evidence obtained incident to the use of undue force
could be suppressed. 2 2 However, the exclusionary rule has been criticized as an impotent deterrent 123 and has recently been limited by

California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952). In Schmerber, the Court held that the taking of
blood samples from the body is reasonable under the fourteenth amendment provided
they are taken to avoid "an unjustified element of personal risk and pain." 384 U.S. at
772. Professor La Fave states:
[I]t would seem to follow that the seizure of a person must likewise be reasonable from the use-of-force standpoint. And if, as held in Rochin v. California,the
use of a stomach pump to seize evidence from the body violates due process
because it is 'conduct that shocks the conscience,' then it would likewise appear
to follow that due process is violated by a shocking use of force in making a
seizure of a person.
2 W. LA FAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 5.1 (1978).
Furthermore, La Fave argues that the fact that the purpose of an arrest is to obtain
custody rather than acquire evidence is insignificant. Because an "arrest will be unlawful,
necessitating suppression of evidence ... if the arrest is accomplished by an unnecessary
breaking into premises for purposes of arrest, the arrest should not be considered otherwise when it is accomplished by an unnecessary use of force against the person." Id.
120. See State v. Williams, 16 Wash. App. 868, 875, 560 P.2d 1160, 1164 (1977)
(choking defendant so he could hardly breathe exceeds bounds of reasonableness and
evidence should have been suppressed); People v. Parham, 60 Cal. 2d 378, 382 33 Cal.
Rptr. 1001, 1004 (1963) (brutal force in obtaining evidence should require suppression
despite the existence of probable cause).
121. See ABA PROJECT, supra note 4, at 64. Unless an arrestee has suffered severe injuries, the cost of litigation may dissuade a victim of excessive force from pursuing
civil remedies. Id.
122. For example, in State v. Sundberg, 611 P.2d 44 (Alaska 1980), the defendant
sought to suppress a gun which was found on his person after the officer used excessive
force to arrest him.
123. See Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI.
L. REV. 655, 755 (1970). Oaks calls the rule a failure in deterring police because the rule
has no "direct effect on the overwhelming majority of police conduct that is not meant to
result in prosecution." See also Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 415 (1971) (Burger, C. J. dissenting) ("the history of
the supression doctrine demonstrates that it is both conceptually sterile and practically
ineffective . .

").

the Supreme Court.'2 4 It may be that these factors will dissuade

courts from considering an expansion of the rule.
Civil Suits

Though the use of excessive force incident to an arrest does not
currently result in the invocation of the exclusionary rule, other remedies are available. A primary avenue for redress is a federal or state
civil proceeding. Within the last twenty years, extensive litigation 125
over police misconduct has arisen under 42 U.S.C. § 1983128 due to

several Supreme Court decisions expanding liability under this statute. In Monroe v. Pape,12 7 a suit against state officers based on an

illegal search and seizure, the Court held that the existence of a

state remedy does not preclude federal litigation, 128 and that section

1983 should be "read against a background of tort liability that
makes a man responsible for his actions." 2 9 Therefore, abuse by police acting in their official capacity may establish a constitutional
deprivation in addition to a state tort claim. In 1978, the Court expanded section 1983 further. In Monell v. Department of Social
Services, 30 it held that a municipality could be liable for the unconstitutional conduct of its employees if an official policy or custom
causes a plaintiff's injuries.' 3 ' Two years later, the Court further
held that a municipality
could not assert a good faith defense to a
32
section 1983 action.1

A plaintiff asserting a section 1983 claim must first establish two
essential elements: (1) deprivation of a constitutional right, and (2)
124. For example, in United States v. Leon, 104 S.Ct. 3405 (1984), the Court held
that evidence obtained in objectively reasonable reliance on a search warrant later found
to be defective may not be suppressed. However, should the Court expand the good faith
exception beyond the fact of Leon, the applicability of the exclusionary rule to an arrest
made with excessive force would be unaffected. It is unlikely that a determination could
be made that an officer acted in good faith when he made an arrest with excessive force.
125. See When Police Officers Use Deadly Force, 94 U.S. NEws & WORLD REP.
58-59 (1983), in which experts estimate that there are currently 20,000 suits against
police pending.
126. The section provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit
in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
127. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
128. Id. at 183.
129. Id. at 187.
130. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
131. Id. at 694.
132. Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 643 (1980).
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1 33
causation of the deprivation by a person acting under color of law.

Regarding the first requirement, federal courts differ as to which
34
right, if any, is violated by the use of excessive force by police.1

Little unanimity exists as to whether the fourth,3 5 eighth,3 6 or fourteenth amendment

37

is violated by the use of excessive force. Fur-

thermore, at the time Garner was decided, the majority of courts
held that no constitutional right was violated by the use of deadly

force against non-violent felons.
Deadly Force Under Section 1983
Most federal courts upheld the constitutionality of the common
law rule allowing law enforcement officers to kill non-violent fleeing
felons in arrest situations. 13 A few courts, however, laid the groundwork for the Supreme Court's ultimate decision to strike down the

rule. The eighth circuit was the first court to hold that the rule was
unconstitutional in Mattis v. Schnarr, 39 later vacated on procedural

grounds. Mattis invalidated the rule by due process analysis, holding
that the state failed to establish an interest equal to or greater than

the individual's right to life. 140 The sixth circuit in 1983 followed

133. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150 (1970).
134. In Dandridge v. Police Dep't of the City of Richmond, 566 F. Supp. 152
(E.D. Va. 1983), the court discussed the great variation among the circuits in determining which constitutional right may be violated by excessive force. The court said in relation to these cases that "U]udicial analysis of the support in the Constitution or the
Supreme Court cases . . . is . . . very limited and far from conclusive." Id. at 156.
135. U.S. CONST. amend IV. For the text of the amendment see supra note 8.
136. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII provides: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted."
137. The amendment provides:
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property without due process of law; nor deny any person within its
jurisdiction equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
138. See Jones v. Marshall, 528 F.2d 132, 142 (2d Cir. 1975) (common law rule
not fundamentally unfair); Cunningham v. Ellington, 323 F. Supp. 1072, 1075 (W.D.
Tenn. 1971) (the rule is not punishment within the meaning of the eighth amendment).
See also Connors v. McNulty, 697 F.2d 18 (1st Cir. 1983); Wiley v. Memphis Police
Dept. 548 F.2d 1247 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 822 (1977). The common law rule
has also been challenged and upheld in several state courts. See, e.g., Werner v.
Hartfelder, 113 Mich. App. 747, 318 N.W.2d 825 (1982); Schumann v. McGuinn, 307
Minn. 446, 240 N.W.2d 525 (1976).
139. 547 F.2d 1007 (8th Cir. 1976), vacated as moot sub nom. Ashcroft v. Mattis,
431 U.S. 171 (1977).
140. The court in Mattis found that it was the function of the judiciary to balance
"the interests of society in guaranteeing the right to life of an individual against the
interest of society in insuring public safety." 547 F.2d at 1019. In this due process analy-

607

Mattis in Garner v. Memphis Police Dept., 4 ' and held that the rule
was both a violation of due process and of the fourth amendment's

prohibition of unreasonable seizures.14 The Supreme Court's affirmation finally resolves the conflict of opinion as to the constitutionality of the felony-misdemeanor rule. 143 The Supreme Court relied exclusively on the fourth amendment's prohibition of unreasonable
searches and seizures in Tennessee v. Garner.4 4 The Court began its
analysis by stating that apprehension by use of deadly force is a
seizure for fourth amendment purposes.1 4 r The Court then used a
balancing test to determine the reasonableness of the seizure.14 6 The
nature of the intrusion on the suspect's fourth amendment rights and
his interest in life were weighed against society's interest in effective
law enforcement. 47 Under this analysis, the Court found that the
use of deadly force as a means to arrest all felony suspects is "constitutionally unreasonable.' ' 48 The Court concluded that "[i]t
is not
'
better that all felony suspects die than that they escape. "149
One of the most important aspects of Garner is that it firmly establishes that the use of deadly force in effecting an arrest is a constitutional issue. Prior to Garner, courts which upheld the common
law felony-misdemeanor rule often defered to the legislature as the
proper forum to modify the rule. 50 By this approach, the problem of
sis, the court relied on Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1976), in which the Supreme
Court held that a state may proscribe a woman's right to abort her pregnancy subsequent
to viability only by establishing a compelling state interest. Mattis cited Roe and stated
that "[b]ecause we deal with a fundamental right, the Missouri statutes can be sustained
only if they protect a compelling state interest 'narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate state interest at stake.'" 547 F.2d at 1019. In Tennessee v. Garner, 52 U.S.L.W.
4410 (U.S. Mar. 27, 1985), the Supreme Court made no mention of Mattis. The Court
did, however, use a balancing test similar to that used in Mattis, in which a person's
interest in his life is weighed against the public's interest in law enforcement.
141. 710 F.2d 240 (6th Cir. 1983), a.f'd sub nom. Tennessee v. Garner 53
U.S.L.W. 4410 (U.S. Mar. 27, 1985).
142. 710 F.2d at 247. The sixth circuit in Garner held, as in Mattis, that the state
failed to meet due process requirements because it could not justify the common law rule
by establishing a compelling state interest. The sixth circuit, unlike the Supreme Court's
analysis, found little case law supporting its fourth amendment analysis and relied heavily on Jenkins v. Averett, 424 F.2d 1228 (4th Cir. 1970), discussed infra note 145 and
accompanying text. For a detailed analysis of the lower court's disposition of Garner, see
Comment, The Unconstitutional Use of Deadly Force Against Non- Violent Fleeing
Felons: Garner v. Memphis Police Dep't, 18 GA. L. REv. 137 (1983).
143. Tennessee v. Garner, 53 U.S.L.W. 4410 (U.S. Mar. 27, 1985).
144. Id. at 4411.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 4412.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Wiley v. Memphis Police Dep't, 548 F.2d 1247, 1252 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 822 (1977); Werner v. Hartfelder, 113 Mich. App. 747, 751, 318 N.W.2d 825,
827 (1982). See also Mattis v. Schnarr, 547 F.2d 1007, 1020 (8th Cir. 1976) (Gibson,
C.J. dissenting), vacated as moot sub nom. Ashcroft v. Mattis 431 U.S. 171 (1977).

[VOL. 22: 587, 1985]

Effecting Seizure
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

police killings was deemed a public policy issue for legislative consideration rather than a constitutional issue for judicial determination.'5' Nevertheless, one scholar has observed that legislatures are
reluctant to restrict police procedures because the public's fear of
crime makes such legislation politically unpopular. 152 This contention seems to be supported by the continued viability of the common
law rule up to the time Garner was decided.
Excessive Force Under Section 1983
Despite the conflicts regarding the use of deadly force, most courts
agree that the use of excessive force to effect an arrest can, in some
circumstances, give rise to a section 1983 claim. 1 53 Even so, substantial conflict exists in the federal courts as to which constitutional
right is violated and by what degree of unreasonable force.
Some courts have held that the use of excessive force to effect an
arrest is a fourth amendment violation.' 54 In Jenkins v. Averett, 55 a
police officer shot a man who had not committed a crime and was
not charged with one. The court noted the language of the fourth
amendment which specifically protects the security of the person. 58
It stated that "this shield covers the individual's integrity," and held
that excessive force is an unreasonable seizure. 57 Similarly, the
court in Soto v. City of Sacramento 5 8 found a fourth amendment
151. "It is clearly the perogative of the state legislature to decide whether such
restrictions on the use of force are consonant with public policy." Wiley v. Memphis
Police Dep't, 548 F.2d 1247, 1253 (6th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 822 (1977).
152. See Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REv.
378 (1974). In discussing the unwillingness of legislatures to restrict police procedures,
Amsterdam notes that "there will remain more than enough crime and fear of it in
American society to keep our legislatures from the politically suicidal undertaking of
police control." Id. at 379.
153. See Classon v. Krautkramer, 451 F. Supp. 12, 13 (E.D. Wis. 1977); Bur v.
Gilbert, 415 F. Supp. 335, 339 (E.D. Wis. 1976); Everett v. City of Chester, 391 F.
Supp. 26, 28 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (excessive force is actionable under § 1983).
154. Davis v. Murphy, 559 F.2d 1098 (7th Cir. 1977) (excessive force is a fourth
amendment violation); Carter v. Carlson, 447 F.2d 358, 363 (D.C. Cir. 1971), 'rev'd on
other grounds sub nom. District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418 (1973) (an arrest
made with excessive force is an unreasonable search and seizure); Samuel v. Busnuck,
423 F. Supp. 99, 103 (D.C. Me. 1976) (fourth amendment applies to police officers using
unreasonable force).
155. 424 F.2d 1228 (4th Cir. 1970).
156. The court noted that "[i]t should not be forgotten that the Fourth Amendment expressly declares 'the right of the people to be secure in their persons .... '" Id.
at 1232.

157. Id.
158.

567 F. Supp. 662 (E.D. Cal. 1983).

violation in the use of excessive force. 1 9 The court maintained that
there is a continuing obligation of reasonableness under the fourth
amendment even when probable cause is found. 160
A fourth amendment analysis of excessive force is appropriate because the amendment clearly addresses seizures of the person. However, not all courts follow a fourth amendment analysis when confronted with claims of excessive force incident to an arrest. 61 The
reluctance of courts to classify the use of excessive force to arrest as
an unreasonable seizure may be the result of a singular emphasis 6on2
probable cause as determinative of the legality of the arrest.
Hence, the element of probable cause and the manner by which an
arrest is made are considered by some courts as separate legal questions. 163 Garner could provide precedent for future assertions that
there is a fourth amendment violation when the use of force is
excessive.

Courts have also found fourteenth"6 and eighth amendment""5 violations in situations where law enforcement officers use excessive
force to arrest. Courts have been receptive to a fourteenth amendment due process analysis, holding that unreasonable force at the
hands of police violates liberty interests. 6 6 The eighth amendment,
on the other hand, is less often applied to section 1983 claims against
officers for the use of excessive force.16 7 For example, Soto followed
159. Id. at 672.
160. Id.
161. See United States v. Reed, 639 F.2d 896 (2d Cir. 1981). In Reed, the court
rejected the fourth amendment claim and stated that "[tihe seizure was pursuant to an
arrest warrant issued with probable cause and therefore, 'reasonable' for the purposes of
the Fourth Amendment . . . ." Id. at 901. See also Popow v. City of Margate, 476 F.
Supp. 1237 (E.D. Pa. 1979), in which the court said, regarding Jenkins, that "[i]t constitutes a strained construction of the fourth amendment to term a negligent killing a
'search and seizure.'" Id. at 1242 n.2.
162. Many courts have stated that an arrest made with excessive force is lawful.
See, e.g., Hernandez v. City of Los Angeles, 624 F.2d 935, 937 (9th Cir. 1980) (a technically lawful arrest can be accomplished with excessive force); People v. Curtis, 70 Cal.
2d 347, 350, 450 P.2d 33, 39 74 Cal. Rptr. 713, 720 (1969) (the question of reasonable
force is distinct from the legality of the arrest); Houghtaling v. State, 175 N.Y.S.2d 659,
666 (1958) (excessive force does not affect the legality of the arrest). This language is
problematic because it implies that excessive force is lawful. Instead, the reasoning
should be that an arrest is lawful because it was made with probable cause, even though
it was accomplished in an unlawful manner.
163. This thesis may also explain why courts have not considered the exclusionary
rule, discussed supra, in this area.
164. See supra note 137.
165. See supra note 136.
166. Conklin v. Barfield, 334 F. Supp. 475, 479 (N.D. Mo. 1971). See also
Courtney v. Reeves, 635 F.2d 326, 329 (5th Cir. 1981) (the right to due process of law
includes the right not to be treated with excessive force); Hamilton v. Chaffin, 506 F.2d
904, 909 (5th Cir. 1975) (excessive force violates due process); Melton v. Shivers, 496 F.
Supp. 781, 784 (M.D. Ala. 1980) (officers who beat or inflict punishment are not acting
in conformance with due process of law).
167. A few courts have held that the use of excessive force is an eighth amendment
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Supreme Court precedent in other settings168 and held that the four-

teenth and not the eighth amendment was the 1proper
vehicle for ad6 9
dressing pre-trial claims of undue punishment.

The degree of unreasonable force required to constitute a section
1983 claim is also ill-defined. Although a section 1983 violation may

also constitute a state tort claim, 7 0 many courts hold that mere tortious conduct alone will not constitute a constitutional deprivation.tm7

Some courts determine that a battery becomes a constitutional violation when the force is inflicted as punishment.7 2 This determination

again illustrates that grossly excessive rather, than mere unreasonable force, is needed to establish a claim against an officer. The stan-

dard may also explain why most successful section 1983 actions involve cases of flagrant police misconduct resulting either in death or

serious physical injury. 7 3 A plaintiff with lesser injuries may have
violation. See Clark v. Ziedonis, 513 F.2d 79, 80 n.1 (7th Cir. 1975); Howell v. Cataldi,
464 F.2d 272, 282-83 (3d Cir. 1972); Moats v. Village of Schaumberg, 562 F. Supp.
624, 629 (N.D. I11.1983).
168. The court in Soto v. City of Sacramento, 567 F. Supp. 662, 671-72 (E.D. Cal.
1983) rejected the eighth amendment claim by relying on Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520,
535, n.16 (1979). In Bell, pre-trial detainees challenged the constitutionality of living
conditions in a short-term custodial facility. The Court held that the fourteenth and not
the eighth amendment was the proper basis for pre-trial claims of undue punishment.
The Supreme Court reiterated this position in Revere v. Massachusetts General Hospital,
103 S. Ct. 2979, 2983 (1983) and held that the eighth amendment is not applicable until
there has been a formal adjudication of guilt.
169. Soto v. City of Sacramento, 567 F. Supp. 662, 671-72 (E.D. Cal. 1983).
170. See supra notes 126-29 and accompanying text. Plaintiffs in § 1983 actions
may join a pendent state claim to a constitutional claim. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Averett,
424 F.2d 1228, 1229 (4th Cir. 1970) (claim stated for constitutional violation and assault
and battery); Popow v. City of Margate, 476 F. Supp. 1237, 1240 (E.D. N.J. 1979)
(claim stated under § 1983 and New Jersey Tort Claims Act).
171. Shillingford v. Holmes, 634 F.2d 263, 265 (5th Cir. 1981) (some state-inflicted injury is so minor as to amount only to a state tort, not a constitutional violation);
Moats v. Village of Schaumberg, 562 F. Supp. 624, 629 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (a tort under
state law may not be actionable under § 1983); Bur v. Gilbert, 415 F. Supp. 335, 341
(E.D. Wis. 1976) (force used must be more than a technical battery).
172. See, e.g., Melton v. Shivers, 496 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1980), wherein the
court stated that "[tihe function of police officers is not to determine guilt and inflict
punishment. Therefore, if police officers act beyond their lawful authority and be at or
otherwise inflict corporal injury upon suspects by way of punishment ... this action is
not in conformity with due process of law." Id. at 787. See also Dandrige v. Police Dep't
of City of Richmond, 566 F. Supp. 152, 161 (E.D. Va. 1983) (the question is whether
the officer inflicted injury with malice).
A finding of punishment by an officer also serves to negate the good faith defense
which is available under § 1983, based on Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967). In
Pierson, the Court held that "[p]art of the background of tort liability... is the defense
of good faith .. . ." Id. at 556-57. See Feemster v. Dehnter, 661 F.2d 87, 89 (8th Cir.
1981) (there can be no question of good faith when officers inflict punishment).
173. ABA PROJECT, supra note 4, at 64.

difficulty establishing that a -"mere battery" is a constitutional
infraction.
State Courts

Establishing a cause of action in state court may be less problematic for an injured arrestee. Because suit may be brought under tort
principles of liability, 174 a constitutional violation is not essential.
Nevertheless, plaintiffs often prefer federal to state court because a
successful plaintiff may recover attorney fees in a section 1983 action. 175 Therefore, the cost of litigation may make state court a viable alternative17only
for injuries severe enough to promise a substan6
tial judgment.
In state proceedings, there is conflict regarding the standard of
care against which an officer's conduct is measured. While some
courts hold that police department rules are admissible as a stan-

dard, 7 7 other courts reject administrative regulations and hold that
state law controls.'

78

Because departmental policy is often more re-

strictive than state law, 17 9 it is to a plaintiff's advantage to use departmental policy as a standard of care. Studies suggest that a con-

flict of interest between city attorneys and police administrators
further complicates the problem of restricting the use of force in departmental policy. 80 It is frequently assumed that clear-cut standards on the use of force may result in expanded civil liability should
those standards be violated.' 8 '

174. In state courts, suits commonly allege wrongful death, assault and battery,
false arrest, and negligence. See generally TRAFFIC INSTITUTE, CIVIL LIABILITY AND THE
POLICE (1982) (overview of case law on police litigation in state and federal court).
175. Id. at 3.
176. ABA PROJECT, supra note 4, at 64.
177. See, e.g., Grudt v. City of Los Angeles, 2 Cal. 3d 375, 383, 468 P.2d 825,
831, 86 Cal. Rptr. 465, 471 (1970); Delong v. City and County of Denver, 520 P.2d
1308 (Colo. App. 1974).
178. See, e.g, City of St. Petersberg v. Reed, 330 So. 2d 256, 258 (Fla. App.
1976); Chastain v. Civil Service Board of Orlando, 327 So. 2d 230, 232 (Fla. App.
1976).
179. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
180. See H. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 65, at 123-24. Goldstein explains that city
attorneys, who defend the city in lawsuits, often become concerned over expanded civil
liability when clear policy regarding force is written.
181. Id. See also K. MATULIA, supra note 12, at 33. In this report, the International Association of Chiefs of Police cautions police administrators against writing weak
policy to avoid potential lawsuits. The report, however, also recommends that a written
policy include a disclaimer that the policy "not be construed as a creation of a higher
legal standard of safety" in a civil or criminal proceeding. Id.
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Impact of Civil Suits
The adequacy of either section 1983 actions or state proceedings
as viable remedies for injured plaintiffs has been questioned. 182 In
both state and federal courts, plaintiffs face numerous hurdles in
winning verdicts. The plaintiff may be a minority, uneducated, and
possibly accused of criminal activity.'3 s These factors tend to make 84a
plaintiff less credible to a jury than a police-officer defendant.
Furthermore, as a practical matter, a civil suit for damages is an
unsatisfactory recourse for the victim of excessive force who has suffered little or no injury.

The deterrent effect of civil proceedings is also uncertain. The
Presidents Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration
of Justice found that civil litigation seemed an unlikely tool to shape
police practices. 8 5 Additionally, a 1979 study of 149 section 1983
actions against the police found that few polity changes resulted
from litigation. 8 6 The dearth of deterrence was attributed to small
and infrequent awards, continued police support from civic leaders,
and the inconsequential impact on individual officers who were either
insured or indemnified against adverse judgments. 8 However, these
actions do have some effect on police procedures. For example, a
fifty-million dollar damage suit filed against a Southern California
city and police department Drovoked an official investigation into numerous complaints of police brutality, 8 8 even though this suit ulti182. See Takagi, Death by Police Intervention, in A COMMUNITY CONCERN: POLICE USE OF DEADLY FORCE 31 (1979). "To prosecute an individual police officer for the
wrongful death of a citizen ... is distributive justice and not social justice." Id. at 39.
See also Hinds, Police Use of Excessive Force: Racial Implications, in A COMMUNITY
CONCERN: POLICE USE OF DEADLY FORCE 9 (1979) (asserting that civil litigation will
not produce systematic changes in the police use of deadly force).
183. GUARDIANS, supra note 3, at 129.
184. Id.
185.

PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF

JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE POLICE (1967) [hereinafter cited as TASK FORCE
REPORT]. "[lit seems apparent that civil litigation is an awkward method of stimulating

proper law enforcement policy. At most, it can furnish relief for the victim of clearly
improper police practices." Id. at 32.

186.
187.

Project, Suing the Police in Federal Court, 88 YALE L.J. 781 (1979).
Id.at 813.

188.

This suit was filed by the parents of Ron Settles against the city and police

department of Signal Hill, California. Settles was a black college football player who was
stopped for a traffic violation and arrested for possession of cocaine by Signal Hill Police.
N.Y. Times, Nov. 2, 1981, at 16, col. 3. Police officers admitted beating Settles because

he was belligerent during the arrest; three hours later he was found hanging in his jail
cell. L.A. Times, Dec. 9, 1981, § II, at 1, col. 5. A coroner's inquest jury ruled that the

death was "at the hands of another" and not a suicide, as police claimed. San Diego

mately settled out of court.189 Although less sensational cases may
go largely unnoticed, some civil suits do result in public, if not municipal, pressure on police practices.
Criminal Sanctions

Criminal sanctions are an even more unlikely deterrent to the use
of excessive force than civil actions. Numerous factors impede criminal prosecution of police officers. At the state level, vigorous prosecutions are often hindered because local district attorneys are unwilling
to charge police with criminal conduct due to the necessary interaction between the two groups."9 At both the state and federal levels,

the higher burden of proof contributes to the paucity of criminal
prosecution. 9 As in civil actions, juries must often decide whether
to believe the police officer's account of an arrest situation or the
arrestee's. In these 1cases,
juries are most likely to defer to the judg92
ment of the officer.
Criminal prosecution at the federal level is also rare. 93 The two
principal federal statutes under which these actions are brought are
18 U.S.C. § 241'19 (requiring a conspiracy) and 18 U.S.C. § 242.9 5
Union, Sept. 3, 1981, § E, at 2, col. 1. The district attorney dropped criminal charges
against the officers due to insufficient evidence. L.A. Times, Jan. 15, 1982, at 1, col. 5.
189. N.Y. Times, Jan. 14, 1983, at 8, col. 5.
190. GUARDIANS, supra note 3, at 103.
191. See Comment, United States v. City of Philadelphia: A Continued Quest For
an Effective Remedy For Police Misconduct, 7 BLACK L.J. 180, 197 (1981).
192. GUARDIANS, supra note 3, at 102.
193. The U.S. Department of Justice receives more than 10,000 complaints of police misconduct each year and prosecutes between fifty and one hundred. See GUARDIANS, supra note 3, at 112-13.
194. The section provides as follows:
If two or more persons conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any
citizen in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him
by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or because of his having so
exercised the same; or
If two or more persons go in disguise on the highway, or on the premises of
another, with intent to prevent or hinder his free exercise or enjoyment of any
right or privilege so secured They shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than ten
years, or both; and if death results, they shall be subject to imprisonment for any
term of years or for life.
18 U.S.C. § 241 (1982).
195. The section provides:
Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, willfully subjects any inhabitant of any State, Territory, or District to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or
laws of the United States, or to different punishments, pains, or penalties, on account of such inhabitant being an alien, or by reason of his color, or race, than are
prescribed for the punishment of citizens, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or
imprisoned not more than one year, or both; and if death results shall be subject
to imprisonment for any term of years or for life.
18 U.S.C. § 242 (1982).

[VOL. 22: 587. 1985]

Effecting Seizure
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

Section 242 is essentially the criminal counterpart to section 1983
though it also requires proof of specific intent to deprive a person of
a constitutional right.196 Like section 1983, section 242 also seems to
require egregious wrongdoing before a constitutional violation will be
found, l97 further limiting the incidence of criminal prosecution.
In summary, because of their infrequency and limited scope, state
and federal prosecutions have little impact on the use of force by law
enforcement officers. In addition, criminal prosecution, by its nature,
addresses individual misconduct rather than inadequate standards
that may make misconduct likely.1 98 For instance, a violence-prone
officer may be criminally prosecuted and dismissed from a department. However, this will not prevent the use of excessive force that
occurs within the law as a result of overbroad rules.
Injunctions

Another method of externally controlling police practices is an injunction. Plaintiffs have had only limited success at the federal level
in obtaining injunctions against the police.199 A recent example is
City of Los Angeles v. Lyons. 00 In Lyons, the plaintiff sought in-

junctive relief barring the use of the chokehold by the Los Angeles
Police Department. The plaintiff had allegedly been subjected to the
restraint procedure after being stopped for a traffic violation and offering no resistance." 1 The Supreme Court dismissed the claim,
196. The Supreme Court imposed the requirement of specific intent in Screws v.
United States, 325 U.S. 91, 101 (1945).
197. See, e.g., United States v. Delerme, 457 F.2d 156 (3d Cir. 1972). "It is one
thing to be guilty of excessive force, and thus chargeable with violating the law of the
state or territory; it is quite another for a policeman to administer physical beating as
punishment for allegedly breaking the law." Id. at 161.
198. The U.S. Commission on Civil Rights found that a principal obstacle to criminal prosecution against the police is that the criminal law is designed to redress specific
incidents of misconduct rather than the activities of an entire department. See GUARDIANS, supra note 3, at 101.
199. In Rizzo v. Goode, 423XU.S. 362 (1976), the Supreme Court reversed the
lower court's order which required the Philadelphia Police Department to develop a comprehensive program for addressing civilian complaints of police misconduct. The Court
reversed on the grounds that (1) the class action plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that they
were threatened by an immediate injury, and (2) federal intrusion into the state's administration of its own laws was inappropriate. Id. at 374, 378-79.
Federal injunctions have been granted in cases establishing patterns of police misconduct. See Allee v. Medrano, 416 U.S. 802 (1974) (enjoining a police department from
interfering with formation of union organizational activities); Lankford v. Gelston, 364
F.2d 197 (4th Cir. 1966) (enjoining a police department from the practice of conducting
warrantless searches based on anonymous tips).
200. 461 U.S. 95 (1983).
201. Id. at 98.

holding that the plaintiff lacked standing to sue because he could not
prove an immediate threat of again suffering injury as a result of the
practice.20 2 In doing so, the Court reiterated its position that the balance of powers limits the federal judicial role in police affairs.2 0 3 It
directed plaintiffs who seek equitable
relief against municipal police
04
to pursue actions in state court.1
The unwillingness of plaintiff to pursue equitable relief against local police in state courts seems, at first glance, perplexing because
local police are engaged in the administration of the state's criminal
laws.205 One scholar has attributed the reluctance of plaintiffs to
pursue actions in state courts to several factors.2 06 First, the doctrine
of res judicata may prevent subsequent federal litigation. Plaintiffs
may be unwilling to sacrifice a possible federal claim. 20 7 Second, federal judges are presumed to be more supportive of citizens' rights to
be free from improper police activities. State judges, who are concerned with re-election, may be reluctant to condemn police
practices.208
At the state or federal level, injunctive relief seems unlikely to
change existing law. Injunctive relief is valuable only when a particular illegal activity is supported by a police department. 09 Assuming
that the use of undue physical force is the product of inadequate
rules and ineffective deterrents, injunctive relief against a particular
department will have little effect on the general use of excessive
force.
Non-Judicial Controls Over Police
Another alternative for regulating police use of force is to monitor
police practices either within a department or by external review.
The effectiveness of these non-judicial controls, however, is contested. Although one report did find that internal procedures were
202. The Court stated the following:
That Lyons may have been illegally choked by the police . . . does nothing to
establish a real and immediate threat that he would again be stopped for a traffic
violation, or for any other offense, by an officer or officers who would illegally
choke him into unconsciousness without any prdocation or resistance on his part.
Id. at 95.
203. The Court in Lyons recognized "the need for a proper balance between state
and federal authority counsels restraint in the issuance of injunctions against state officers engaged in the administration of the states' criminal laws. . . ." Id. at 112.
204. "The individual states may permit their courts to issue injunctions to oversee
the conduct of law enforcement authorities . . . . [T]his is not the role of the federal
court absent far more justification.
Id. at 113.
205. Id. at 112.
206. H. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 65, at 181.
207. Id. at 186 n.50.
208. Id. at 181.
209. See supra note 199.
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the best way to deal with police misconduct, 210 various other sources
question the
adequately.2 1 '

ability

of

the

police

to

monitor

themselves

Numerous factors can hinder effective internal control. Objective
internal investigation is difficult because police officers are often the
only witness to police actions other than the arrestee.2

12

One scholar

found that officers will rarely incriminate each other and will either
support a fellow officer's action or deny knowledge of the incident.21
A further complication is that departmental policy is often vague
concerning standards of conduct in police-citizen encounters. 21 4 Absent active contributions by police administrators and officers, the

effectiveness of internal investigation is limited.
External review board evaluation of complaints is an alternative to

internal monitoring. These review boards consist either entirely of
citizens or of a combined group of police and citizens. 21 5 In the past

twenty years, citizen review boards have had limited national success. 216 Their overall failure has been attributed to various factors,
such as police resistance to and resentment of outside review,217 and
complicated procedures which are designed to insure fairness but
produce confusion for those seeking review.2 1i The United States
Commission on Civil Rights found that the failure of citizen review
boards was primarily due to their limited advisory nature and lack of
power to decide cases or impose discipline. 219 Even so, some com-

210. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 185, at 193.
211. The U.S. Commission on Civil Rights reported that an officer in Philadelphia
was disciplined on nine different occasions before being dismissed. See GUARDIANS,
supra note 3, at 85. Also, an officer involved in the Signal Hill investigation, discussed
supra note 178, had been previously named in nine brutality claims. In six instances, the
arrestees said that they were beaten until they became unconscious. L.A. Times, Oct. 11,
1981, at 3, col. 1. See also H. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 65, at 160-65. Goldstein notes that
often a citizen's complaint will be about police conduct which was actually within the
officer's legal authority. Many departments will, therefore, vindicate the officer's conduct
even though he acted improperly but not illegally.
212. Id. at 165.
Is
213. Id. at 165-66.
214. Id. at 162.
215. GUARDIANS, supra note 3, at 124.
216. See Comment, supra note 191, at 197.
217. See ABA PROJECT, supra note 4, at 66. See also W. GELLHORN, WHEN
AMERICANS COMPLAIN

(1966), in which the author reports that in 1965, the Interna-

tional Association of Chiefs of Police described civilian review boards as a type of control
alien to the democratic process. Id. at 171.
218. Id. at 185-88. Gellhorn describes a complicated New York procedure in 1966
and he concludes that the complainant would begin to wonder "whether the game was
worth the effort."
219. GUARDIANS, supra note 3, at 125.

mentators believe that external citizen review is the best means of
curbing excessive force, reasoning that civilian authority can spark
public awareness of police officer abuse of discretion.""
In sum, citizen review may be an important vehicle for objective
review of complaints if it is made more accessible to the public.
However, both internal and external review occur only subsequent to
an officer's alleged wrongdoing which provokes a citizen's complaint.
Like the criminal law, review assesses, at best, individual misconduct
and makes no attempt to change inadequate standards of conduct.
Empirical Data
Statutory and case law illustrate some legal limits on the use of
force to effect the seizure of the person. The wide varieties of remedies noted above indicate that there is a recognized need for some
avenue of redress for injured persons. Statistical data, however, clarifies the need for stricter rules on the use of force. It has been concluded that police homicides and abuses are too frequent 221 or too
arbitrary.222 Moreover, available statistics reveal the impact in loss
of life that the existing inadequate legal rules have on society.
The IACP estimates that between 1970 and 1979, 3094 persons
were killed by police in fifty-seven United States cities,223 The IACP
also found that jurisdictions with the common law rule on deadly
force had a considerably higher "justifiable homicide rate" than either modified common law or Model Penal Code states.224 Though
the actual number of police homicides is uncertain,225 the IACP's
estimations indicate that between 1970 and 1979, American police
have killed, on the average, nearly one person per day. 2
Every available study in the last twenty years recognizes that minorities are the victims in a disproportionate number of police killings.227 This imbalance has been attributed to a variety of factors,
220. Hinds, supra note 182, at 7, 9.
221. Harper, supra note 43, at 368.
222. Sherman, supra note 33. Sherman suggests that a reasonable inference can be
drawn that police homicides are arbitrary, based on the relative rarity of occurrences per
number of arrests. Id. at 94.
223. K. MATULIA, supra note 12, at 22.
224. Id. at 12.
225. Police department reporting of data regarding justifiable homicides to the
FBI is voluntary. The second major source of data, the National Center for Health Statistics, records police killings from death certificates. These tabulations are assumed to be
inaccurate due to poor medical diagnosis and mechanical errors. Id. at 15.
226. K. MATULIA, supra note 12, at 22. See also Carrington, Searchingfor Remedies, in A. COMMUNITY CONCERN: POLICE USE OF DEADLY FORCE 53 (1979).
227. K. MATULIA, supra note 12, at 14. The report found that blacks comprised
59.6% of persons killed by police. See also C. MILTON, J. HALLECK, J. LARDNER & G.
ALBRECHT, POLICE USE OF DEADLY FORCE 19 (1977), in which blacks were found to
comprise 79% of all shooting victims in a seven-city study. See generally A COMMUNITY
CONCERN: POLICE USE OF DEADLY FORCE (1979) (discussion of empirical data on police
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including possible racial bias 228 and minority over-representation in
arrests for violent crimes.229 One scholar has concluded that, no matter how one interprets the statistics, the number
of blacks killed by
2 30
police is too disproportionate to be justified.
Though many studies have focused on police use of firearms, the
use of other types of force is more incalculable and often ignored
until controversy erupts. The chokehold,23 ' for example, was used
more frequently by the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) in
altercations with citizens than any other control device.2 3 2 At the
time Lyons was brought to the Supreme Court, the device was not
considered "deadly force" by the LAPD, though sixteen persons had
died following its use.233 Reiss, a scholar who has done extensive research on the police, found in a 1966 study that police use of excessive force in metropolitan areas was not uncommon, the most likely
targets being police suspects.2 34 Though this study is nearly twenty
years old, its conclusion regarding the probable victims of excessive
force seems unlikely to be outdated. It is logical to assume that those
most vulnerable to the use of unreasonable force are those with
whom the police are likely to have confrontational encounters.
Other studies indicate that police are provoked to use force for
reasons other than the duty to arrest or stop. For example, citizen
disrespect for police has been found to be a major inducement.2 35 An
officer's fear or panic in a situation may also contribute to the decision to use force.2 3 6 Another study found that younger and more
homicides and minority killings).
228. See Hinds, supra note 182, at 7, 8.
229. K. MATULIA, supra note 12, at 23.
230. Takagi, supra note 182, at 31, 33.
231. The chokehold is a control device. To use, the officer uses his forearm to apply
pressure to a suspect's neck, reducing the flow of oxygen and thereby rendering the person unconscious. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 97 n.1 (1983).
232. Id. at 116.
233. Id.
234. Reiss, supra note 64, at 321. In a seven-week study, Reiss found police used
excessive force in 37 out o f 3826 encounters. Reiss determined that force was excessive
when it was applied in one of the following ways: (1) if a policeman physically assaulted
a citizen and then did not make an arrest; (2) if the citizen being arrested did not resist;
(3) if the policeman could have easily restrained the citizen without force; (4) if many
police officers were present and could have assisted in subduing the citizen; (5) if an
arrestee was handcuffed and offered no resistance; and (6) if the citizen resisted, but the
use of force continued after the citizen was restrained. Id. at 323-24. Reiss cautioned
that his figures were deceptively low because the rate consisted of all encounters between
police and citizens rather than the population most vulnerable to abuse, police suspects
(arrestees or persons stopped). Id. at 327.
235. W. WESTLEY, VIOLENCE AND THE POLICE 122 (1970).
236. See Binder, The Violent Police-Citizen Encounter, 452 ANNALS 114, 118.

inexperienced officers are more likely to resort to the use of firearms
than their older counterparts. 37 These and other factors illustrate
the complicated variable that may determine whether force will be
used in an arrest situation.
Another factor that affects the decision to use force is the training
that an officer receives in the use of force. 238 The United States
Commission on Civil Rights reported in 1981 that training in the use
of deadly force was insufficient and subject to the ambiguities of
state law and administrative policy. 239 The Commission's report
found that new recruits and even experienced officers have difficulty
determining when deadly force may be used according to a vague
statute. 240 Another study found that great disparity existed, among
individual officers in their perception of policy within a single department.241 The training that officers receive in both state law and departmental rules on the use of force may produce confusion. For example, in San Diego, California, police recruits study from training
manuals comprised mostly of state law for a seventeen week course.
Thereafter, seven days are spent learning departmental rules before
field work with a senior officer begins.242 Ignoring other aspects of
training, vague state law offers little or no guidance to a police recruit who is learning about his legal authority to use force.
The variety of factors that influence the use of force by law enforcement officers are too numerous for one Comment to address. It
is clear, however, the legal rules provide the minimum standard to
which administrative policies and individual officers must conform.
Legal rules must be flexible enough to allow an officer to perform his
duties in diverse situations. Currently, these legal standards are so
flexible that the limits of permissible force are ambiguous to citizens
and police.
SUMMARY AND PROPOSAL

The law governing the use of force by law enforcement officers has
not adequately developed to define the boundaries of permissible
force. Statutes, case law, and empirical studies reveal the need for
more restrictive and specific rules rather than for more remedies.
Tennessee v. Garner is an important development, but it is only the
first step toward specificity and modernization of the law. In its
237. Uelmen, supra note 49, at 10-11.
238. The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice found in 1967 that departments nation-wide needed to upgrade their training criteria. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 185, at 142-43.
239. GUARDIAN, supra note 3, at 29-30.
240. Id.
241. Uelmen, supra note 49, at 50.
242. Telephone interview with Adolfo Gonzales, Academy Advisor of San Diego
Regional Law Enforcement Training Center (June 5, 1984).
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narrowest sense, Garner means that an officer may not use deadly
force to arrest a suspect when the officer has probable cause to believe that suspect is non-dangerous. Despite this decision, many statutes are comprised of broad and archaic terms, subject only to judi-

cial restriction. Furthermore, much of current law demands that an
officer make a probable cause judgment of the nature of a crime

committed as a predicate to the use of deadly force. Regarding the
use of non-deadly force, the case law is ambiguous and arbitrary in
its determination of what is reasonable or unreasonable force. Administrative rules, which are the most progressive in terms of limiting force, are of varying clarity and may be useless to an injured

arrestee. Instead, the law often shields that officer from any question
of his judgment. Furthermore, the failure of rulemaking bodies to
agree that excessive force to arrest is an unreasonable seizure under
the fourth amendment makes unclear and equivocal an arrestee's

constitutional protection from unreasonable force.
To limit effectively the use of force, legislative, judicial, and ad-

ministrative bodies must develop standards that both safeguard the
physical security of arrestees and protect law enforcement officers in

the fulfillment of their duties. To date, statutory language on the use
of force is non-specific and unclear. For example, California's statute, based on the common law rule, permits an officer to use "reasonable force" to arrest.2 43 An officer may use deadly force "in ar-

resting persons charged with a felony, and who are fleeing from
justice or resisting such arrest.

2 44

New York's modified common

law statute permits an officer to use physical force "when and to the
extent he reasonably believes such to be necessary," and permits

deadly force for specific felonies. 245 Even the Model Penal Code,

243. CAL. PENAL CODE § 835a (West 1982). "Any peace officer who has reasonable cause to believe that the person to be arrested has committed a public offense may
use reasonable force to effect the arrest, to prevent escape or to overcome resistance."
244. CAL. PENAL CODE § 196 (West 1982). Homicide is justifiable when committed by public officers and those acting by their command in their aid and assistance,
either 1.In obedience to any judgment of a competent court; or
2. When necessarily committed in overcoming actual resistance to the execution
of the legal process, or in the discharge of any other legal duty; or
3. When necessarily committed in arresting persons charged with felony, and
who are fleeing from justice or resisting such arrest.
California courts interpret the common law statute as a modified common law statute.
See supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
245. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.30 (McKinney 1983).
A peace officer ... may use physical force when and to the extent he reasonably
believes such to be necessary to effect the arrest, or to prevent the escape from

which more carefully limits the use of deadly force, only restricts an
officer to use of such non-deadly force as is "immediately necessary"

to effect an arrest.2 46 All three of these statutory approaches are permissible under Garner, yet each one is flawed by vagueness.
Restrictive statutory language need not deprive an arresting officer
of the necessary authority to use force nor hamper him in the performance of his duties. For example, a narrower but more comprehensive statute could provide as follows:
Use of Physical Force in Law Enforcement:
(1) Use of Force to Effect an Arrest: A law enforcement officer, in the
course of making or attempting to make an arrest based upon probable
cause, may use:
(a) a reasonable degree of physical force, short of deadly force, when the
officer reasonably believes such to be necessary to take custody of another.
(b) deadly force only when he reasonably believes that such force is necessary to protect himself or another from imminent death or serious bodily
harm.
(2)Use of Force to Effect an Investigations Stop:
A law enforcement officer, in the course of making or attempting to make
an investigative stop based upon reasonable suspicion, may use a reasonable
degree of physical force, short of deadly force, when the officer believes that
such force is necessary to make the stop or protect himself from potential
physical harm.
(3) A Violation of Any Part of this Statute
Shall Result in One or More of the Following:
(a) Criminal Prosecution:Unless death results, a law enforcement officer
who violates this statute shall be fined not more that $10,000, imprisoned
not more that three years, or both. If death results, the law of homicide
shall govern.
(b) Exclusion of Evidence: A court shall suppress any evidence found
incident to a violation of this statute provided that the motion to suppress is
brought by an accused who was himself the direct subject of such violation;
(c) Existing and future civil remedies against a law enforcement officer
and/or his superiors are not affected by this statute.

The limitation of force by statute cannot address particular police
practices in the use of force. However, this proposed statute would
conform to the principles of Garner and would lay the groundwork
for further developments. In the area of deadly force, statutory language would clarify what many police administrators, legal scholars,
and members of society agree is fundamental: that the sanctity of
life supercedes the benefit of aggressive law enforcement. Because
federal and other police agencies already use this standard, though
no statute has codified it, the rule has been tested as a workable and
custody, or to defend himself or a third person from what he reasonably believes
to be the use of imminent use of physical force.
Deadly force is allowed in self-defense, defense of another, if the felony involved the
use of physical force against a person, and for kidnapping, arson, escape in the first
degree, burglary in the first degree, or any attempt to commit such a crime. Id.

246.

MODEL PENAL CODE

§ 3.07(1) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). "[T]he use of

force upon or toward the person of another is justifiable when the actor is making or
assisting in making an arrest and the actor believes that such force is immediately necessary to effect a lawful arrest." Id.
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realistic standard. Importantly, this standard recognizes that there
are instances, such as the attack discussed in the introduction of this
Comment, where the police must be vested with the legal authority
to kill rather than arrest. Furthermore, the standard relieves an officer from the burden of making a probable cause determination of
the dangerousness of a crime previously committed.
The stricter standard on non-deadly force attempts to minimize
the use of physical force in situations where the arrestee physically
resists the officer's authority or otherwise threatens the officer or another person. Because it is likely that some arrestees will not acquiesce to the officer's orders, an officer must be authorized to use physical force to effect custody. However, the use of force must be legally
justified only in these situations. Once the officer has restrained the
person or when the arrestee complies, the officer's authority to use
force ends.
Another advantage to a narrower rule on the use of deadly and
non-deadly force is that it may obviate the need for an injured arrestee to establish that the officer used grossly excessive rather than
unreasonable force in civil actions. While juries may still favor a police officer-defendant to a plaintiff who was possibly involved in
criminal activity, the plaintiff's burden of proof would not be so
heavy. Presently, the plaintiff's burden of proof against the officer is
akin to the higher burden of proof required for a criminal prosecution. In effect, a narrower rule on the use of force would make unjustified injuries more compensable.
The inclusion of sanctions as part of the statute is intended to
clarify and summarize the penalties for the use of excessive force.
Officers, judges, and citizens should clearly recognize the criminal,
evidentiary, and civil consequences of illegal force. Furthermore, the
extension of the exclusionary rule by statute gives a legislative mandate to invoke the rule when illegal force benefits the prosecution yet
corrupts the criminal justice system.
The judiciary, like the legislature, should uniformly recognize that
excessive force to effect an arrest is a violation of the fourth amendment's prohibition of unreasonable seizures. Because arrests and
stops are both fourth amendment seizures, the existing determinations that excessive force to effect a stop and deadly force to effect
certain arrests are unreasonable seizures support this thesis. Regarding criminal prosecutions, an extension of the exclusionary rule to
arrests made with excessive force would be given further support. In
civil actions under section 1983, an injured plaintiff would be able to

enter a claim on firm constitutional grounds.
The proposed statute also authorizes law enforcement officers to
use reasonable force in making investigative stops. The statute permits the use of reasonable force when an officer meets resistance or
fears for his safety; it does not attempt to specify the type of force
appropriate to the situation. A defendant's primary purpose in contesting the use of force in a stop is to obtain a judgment that the
seizure itself was illegal. The case law in this area, however, often
draws fine distinctions between reasonable and unreasonable force.
Therefore, the role of police administrators is to articulate specific
policy on the type of force permitted to make investigative stops.
Force associated with arrests -

guns and handcuffs -

should be

permitted only in extenuating circumstances where specific facts dictate physical force as necessary to protect the officer and ensure
compliance with his order to stop.
To summarize, the rules on the use of force to effect arrests and
stops should reflect a balance between three criteria: compliance
with the seizure, minimum invasion on the physical security of the
person stopped or arrested, and protection of the police officer and
the public. Some of the current judicial analyses of excessive force to
stop may come nearer to meeting these criteria. Because the degree
of force used to effect a stop may be as integral to the legality of the
seizure as the element of reasonable suspicion, the manner by which
the seizure is made is more likely to conform to the fourth amendment requirements of reasonableness. The use of both deadly and
non-deadly force to arrest should be subject to this type of scrutiny.
Whether Garner's reasonableness requirement will extend to arrests
made with excessive non-deadly force is unclear.
More restrictive rules on the use of force could have the effect of
initially increasing liability of officers and their departments. For example, a uniform rule on the use of deadly force limited to defenseof-life situations could produce civil or criminal liability in instances
where currently only internal discipline may result. However, stricter
legal rules could also decrease departmental liability by making individual officers' responses to situations more uniform. Hence, more
restrictive rules on the use of force would benefit not only citizens
who are subjected to force but also law enforcement officers.
CONCLUSION

Society's interest in the safe and effective containment of violent
behavior must be reflected in the laws and procedure of those
charged with the duty of law enforcement. However, the abuse of
force arouses society's fear of the very agencies empowered to protect it. Trust and cooperation between citizens and police cannot exist in an atmosphere of fear. Through the restriction and redefinition
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of the permissible use of force, society and the police will be free
from the burden of fear to work together toward the mutually desired end of peace and order.
EVE M. CODDON

